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KEEP IT CLEAN: HOW PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES MAY 
CONSTITUTIONALLY ENFORCE POLICIES LIMITING 
STUDENT SPEECH AT COLLEGE BASKETBALL GAMES. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The term "home-field advantage" at public university sporting 
events has taken on an entirely new meaning in recent years. 1 
Traditional chants like "let's go team" are commonly overshadowed 
by cheering speech2 involving profanity,3 attacks on sexuality,4 
derogatory comments aimed at families of opposing players,5 and 
even violence.6 Although meaningful displays of expression 
certainly exist at college sporting events, student cheering speech 
often reaches intolerable levels. 7 Consider the following experiences 
of teenage student athletes when they went on the road to represent 
their universities. 
1. Marissa DeCuir, Schools Try Hard to Foil Fans' Curses, USA TODAY, Nov. 1, 2007, 
at 6C, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/footbalV2007-10-31-fan-
behavior_N.htm ("[C]olleges across the USA are cracking down on stadium 
behavior."). 
2. Howard M. Wasserman, Fans, Free Expression, and the Wide World of Sports, 67 U. 
Pm. L. REV. 525, 527-28 (2006) (defining cheering speech as the expression 
surrounding sports). 
3. Erik Brady, How Free Should Speech Be at Campus Games, USA TODAY, Feb. 6, 
2004, at 1A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketbalV 
2004-02-05-fans-free-speech_ x.htm. 
4. Grant Wahl, Over the Top, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 3, 2008, at 40, 42, available at 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/grant_ wahV02/26/abusive.fans0303/inde 
x.htrnl (discussing a student's sign which read "Kevin Loves John Arnaechi," a pun 
on the names "Kevin Love," a player for the UCLA Bruins, and "John Amaechi," an 
openly gay former player in the National Basketball Association). 
5. Jd. at 40 (discussing "screams of 'whores' that made Kevin Love's grandmother cry"). 
6. Jd. (noting an incident where the mother of Eric Gordon, star player for Indiana 
University, was pelted with a cup of ice water while watching one of her son's 
games). 
7. Myles Brand, Getting a Grip on Fan Behavior in College Sports, Nov. 11, 2008, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/myles-brand/getting-a-grip-on-fan 
beh_b_143034.htrnl~ Mr. Brand is President of the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA). Jd. 
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A. Kevin Love's Visit Home 
As an All-American and consensus national player of the year, 
Kevin Love was arguably the top high school basketball player in the 
history of Oregon.8 Naturally, when he returned to Oregon as a 
UCLA Bruin on January 23, 2008, to play the Oregon Ducks, he 
expected the fans to express their dissatisfaction with his decision to 
leave the state.9 However, not even Love anticipated the way in 
which Oregon's student body would express itself. Stan Love, 
Kevin's father and sixth-leading scorer in Oregon's history, said "his 
family was pelted with popcorn cartons and empty cups, as well as a 
barrage of profane insults . . . including screams of 'whores' that 
made Kevin's grandmother cry .... [and] 'six-year-old kids with 
signs saying KEVIN LOVE SUCKS. "'10 The experience left Love's 
father appalled at the students' behavior and vowing never to return 
to his alma mater. 11 
B. Eric Gordon 's De-Commitment to The University of Illinois 
Just weeks after the incident at Oregon, another high school All-
American standout, Eric Gordon of the Indiana Hoosiers, was 
confronted with similarly inexcusable fan behavior. 12 Gordon and his 
family, who decided to bring their own security detail following the 
Love incident, were subjected to comments like "'I wish you would 
die,"' and '"I hope you break your leg."'13 Another student felt the 
need to launch a cup of ice water at Gordon's mom, Denise, which 
hit her on the back of the head. 14 
C. Maryland Terrapin Students' Treatment of Duke's J.J. Redick 
In recent years, the men's basketball programs at the University of 
Maryland and Duke University have become heated rivals. 15 J.J. 
8. See Wahl, supra note 4; see also Kevin Love Biography, http://www.kevinlove.org/ 
kevin-love-biography.php (last visited Sept. 8, 2009). 
9. Wahl, supra note 4. 
10. Jd. 
II. /d. Stan Love commented: "'[J]ust because my kid didn't pick Oregon he gets abused 




15. See Craig Saperstein, Upon Further Review: Duke-Maryland: The Best Rivalry . .. 
For Now, THE CHRON., Jan. 16, 2002, http://media.www.dukechronicle.com/media/ 
storage/paper884/news/2002/0 I I 16/UndefinedSection/Upon-Further.Review.Duke 
Maryland. The.Best.Rivalry.For.Now-1455889.shtml (describing the beginning of the 
Maryland-Duke rivalry in 2002); see also Corneas/ Sportsnet Showcases Maryland-
2010] Keep It Clean 301 
Redick, second leading scorer in Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC) 
history, 16 was perhaps the most hated "Dukie" to visit Maryland. 
Throughout his career, Redick was the target of Maryland students' 
hostility. 
Students evidenced their hatred towards Redick in a variety of 
ways. During a nationally televised game in 2004, many students 
chanted, "' [Fuck] you, J .J.! "' each time he stepped to the foul line. 17 
A year later, following intense public scrutiny stemming from the 
vulgar chant, one student held a sign containing a poem referencing 
sexual encounters with Redick's sisters. 18 
D. The Problem 
Students are certainly free to express their feelings towards the 
teams that they support and their opponents. The problem lies in the 
manner of expression. Public universities have been unwilling or 
unable to adequately address this behavior. 19 It is unclear whether 
this is a result of administrative policy implicitly encouraging 
unacceptable behavior through inaction, 20 or whether it is a result of 
an inability to confidently restrict student speech without fear of 
constitutional challenge.21 Either way, public universities should 
Duke Rivalry, Feb. 9, 2007, http://umterps.cstv.com/sports/m-baskbl/spec-
rel/020907aab.html (promoting the rivalry prior to a 2007 contest). 
16. Caulton Tudor, Hansbrough Breaks ACC Scoring Record, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, 
Mar. 20, 2009, at lC (noting that Redick is now second on the ACC career scoring list 
to Tyler Hansbrough, who surpassed him on March 19, 2009). 
17. Brady, supra note 3. The article further suggests that college students are too 
immature to understand the significance of their actions. One student was quoted 
saying: "'If you can't curse at a basketball game, what's next, a curfew? ... We're 
paying them for an education, not to tell us what we can say at a basketball game."' 
/d. at 5A. The student fails to realize that part of the education must clearly address 
acceptable social behavior. 
18. Brian Freedman & Brendan Lowe, Dukies, Redick Meet Reformed Terps Fans, 
DIAMONDBACK (College Park, MD), Feb. 14, 2005, at 1, available at http://media. 
www.diamondbackonline.com/media/storage/paper873/news/2005/02/14/NewsonCa 
mpus/Dukies.Redick.Meet.Reformed.Terps.Fans-2320686.shtml. The poem read: 
"'J.J., Here's a Poem: Terps Are Red/ Devils Are Blue/ Jeanie Was Good/ Abby Will 
Be Too."' /d. at 8. 
19. Brand, supra note 7 ("It's time to address this rising problem. We had better get a 
grip on fan behavior."). 
20. /d. ("[T]here are administrators and coaches who judiciously look the other way for 
fear of dampening the enthusiasm that could give an edge to their teams."). 
21. First Amendment Center, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/Speechlpubcollege/ 
faqs.aspx?id=l4022&#ql4022 (last visited Sept. 15, 2009) (addressing why the 
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remember that their purpose is to educate, and that throughout the last 
forty years, the Supreme Court of the United States has afforded them 
wide latitude to restrict speech.22 Dissenting in Papish v. Board of 
Curators of the University of Missouri/3 Chief Justice Burger 
discussed the special role of the public university: 
[I]t is also an institution where individuals learn to express 
themselves in acceptable, civil terms. We provide that 
environment to the end that students may learn the self-
restraint necessary to the functioning of a civilized society 
and understand the need for those external restraints to 
which we must all submit if group existence is to be 
tolerable. 24 
It is this special role of public universities that may ultimately allow 
them to confront the inexcusable fan behavior displayed on campuses 
across the country. 
Commentators who have argued in support of a university's ability 
to place restrictions on intolerable speech have focused primarily on 
Cohen v. California25 and other similar cases, which deal with 
expression.26 Further, they rely heavily on the "captive audience 
doctrine"27 to argue in favor of university-implemented regulations. 28 
However, each of these arguments has paid little attention to the 
unique characteristics of public universities.29 
organization believes a public college stadium cannot prohibit fan profanity simply 
because there are kids in the stands). 
22. See infra Part III.B-C. 
23. 410 U.S. 667, 671 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
24. Jd. at 672. 
25. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
26. See, e.g., Gregory Matthew Jacobs, Comment, Curbing Their Enthusiasm: A Proposal 
to Regulate Offensive Speech at Public University Basketball Games, 55 CATH. U. L. 
REv. 547, 564-65 (2006) (stating that a university's regulation of speech at a 
basketball game will receive the same analysis as did the California statute 
criminalizing disturbance of the peace by offensive conduct in Cohen); Kelley 
Tiffany, Comment, Cheering Speech at State University Athletic Events: How Do You 
Regulate Bad Spectator Sportsmanship?, 14 SPORTS LAW. J. Ill, 119 (2007) 
(utilizing Cohen as support for the assertion that public universities must satisfy strict 
scrutiny for the Court to uphold regulations on expression). 
27. This doctrine "centers on the inability of the audience to avoid hearing or seeing the 
objectionable speech or expression." Tiffany, supra note 26, at 132. 
28. See Jacobs, supra note 26, at 565; Tiffany, supra note 26, at 132 (both authors analyze 
and justify university regulations on captive audience grounds). 
29. See generally Jacobs, supra note 26; Tiffany, supra note 26 (both authors failed to 
consider school missions). 
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This Comment will approach the issue from a different angle. A 
consideration of the university's basic educational mission will be 
necessary to provide the appropriate context under which potential 
policies must be analyzed.30 Student codes of conduct from the 
University of Oregon and the University of Maryland will be relied 
upon as examples of policies that inadequately tackle poor fan 
behavior.31 
Then, rather than attempting to piece together Supreme Court 
rulings on general First Amendment issues, this Comment will rely 
almost exclusively on precedent established in a line of student 
speech decisions.32 After detailing the evolution of the Supreme 
Court's unique approach to analyzing high school and university 
policies, while carefully noting the rationale that allows for certain 
regulations, this Comment will dispose of the argument that 
regulations within the basketball arena are impermissible under the 
public forum doctrine. 33 In particular, several key cases and factors 
will be used to support the argument that universities have developed 
the basketball arena for commercial purposes, have not designated it 
for public discourse, and therefore have not created a designated 
public forum. Accordingly, universities may place reasonable 
restrictions on speech within the basketball arena. 
This Comment will then address the problematic expression that 
occurs within the basketball arena to determine the type of expression 
at which the restrictions should be aimed.34 Next, the focus of this 
Comment will shift to the competing interests involved in creating a 
useful policy.35 These interests include the students' dual concerns of 
freedom of expression36 and administrative discretion/7 as well as the 
universities' unique role as educators.38 Finally, this Comment will 
discuss the important components of a constitutionally sound policy 
that serves the twin goals of promoting the students' right of 
expression and the universities' basic educational missions.39 
30. See infra Part ll.A. 
31. See infra Part Il.B. 
32. See infra Part Ill. 
33. See infra Part IV. 
34. See infra Part V. 
35. See infra Part VI. 
36. See infra Part VI.A.l. 
37. See infra Part VI.A.2. 
38. See infra Part VI.B.l. 
39. See infra Part VII. 
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II. MISSION STATEMENTS AND STUDENT CODES OF 
CONDUCT 
In addition to their individual mission statements, most universities, 
if not all, have a student code of conduct, which addresses student 
behavior and life in general on their campuses. Mission statements 
and codes of conduct often define a university's existence and 
address the values that it seeks to instill in its students.40 
A. Mission Statements 
When considering any policies limiting student speech, it is 
paramount that the universities and the courts keep in mind the very 
reasons that universities exist. These reasons will later serve as 
justification for constitutionally implementable speech codes. 
For example, consider the University of Maryland's four-page 
mission statement, last amended in November of 2000.41 In the very 
first paragraph, under the heading "Institutional Identity,"42 the 
university states that "[t]o realize its aspirations and fulfill its 
mandates, the University advances knowledge, provides outstanding 
and innovative instruction, and nourishes a climate of intellectual 
growth in a broad range of academic disciplines and interdisciplinary 
fields."43 Consistently underlying each phrase of that sentence is the 
university's unique role as a mentor and teacher of its students.44 
Under the "Institutional Objectives and Outcomes" section, the 
university states that it will "[ e ]nsure a university environment that is 
inclusive as well as diverse and that fosters a spirit of community.'>45 
This part of the university's mission statement is indicative of the 
university's need to promote civility and community among its 
40. See JEFFREY ABRAHAMS, THE MISSION STATEMENT BOOK: 301 CORPORATE MISSION 
STATEMENTS FROM AMERICA'S TOP COMPANIES 8 (Ten Speed Press 1999) (1995) 
(containing discussion of the importance and purpose of mission statements in various 
organizations, which is comparable and transferrable to educational mission 
statements). 
41. Mission Statement, University of Maryland, College Park, http://www.provost.umd. 
edu/Strategic_Planning!Mission2000.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2009) [hereinafter 
UMD Mission Statement]. 
42. Jd. 
43. Jd. 
44. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24 (discussing the special role of the public 
university). 
45. See UMD Mission Statement, supra note 41. 
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students, a lesson that is continually diminished by episodes of unruly 
fan behavior.46 
The University of Oregon's mission statement sends a similar 
message to its readers. Stating that "[a ]cademic quality is the 
cornerstone of the University of Oregon's identity,"47 the university 
defines itself as a "unique institution that will challenge students to 
change the world by giving them the skills and knowledge to 
question critically, think logically, communicate clearly, act 
creatively, and live ethically."48 As part of the college experience, 
the environment at basketball games necessarily serves to foster the 
academic quality to which the university's mission statement refers, 
as well as to supplement the educational process of teaching students 
critical, creative, and ethical thinking and communication skills.49 
However, the university's satisfaction of these objectives is impeded 
when its students are allowed to call Kevin Love's grandmother a 
"whore."50 
B. Codes of Conduct 
While university mission statements are used as a means of 
communicating the role of universities, the codes of conduct are 
essentially the universities' means of assuring the successful 
completion of those missions.51 The University of Maryland 
emphasizes the importance of its Code of Academic Integrity and its 
Code of Student Conduct: 
'The biggest educational challenge we face revolves around 
developing character, conscience, citizenship, tolerance, 
civility, and individual and social responsibility in our 
students. We dare not ignore this obligation in a [sic] 
46. See supra Part LA-C (providing examples and analyzing the impact of unruly student 
behavior). 
47. Best Colleges, University of Oregon (2009), http://colleges.usnews.rankingsand 
reviews.com/college/iterns/3223 (last visited Sept. 11, 2009) [hereinafter UO Mission 
Statement]. 
48. /d. 
49. See generally UO Mission Statement, supra note 47. 
50. Wahl, supra note 4, at 40. 
51. See University of Maryland Code of Student Conduct, http://www.president.umd.edu 
/policies/docs/vlOOb.pdf (last visited Sept. ll, 2009) [hereinafter UMD Code of 
Conduct] (noting that the primary purpose of its code is to "protect the campus 
community" and that, "[ c ]onsistent with that purpose, reasonable efforts will ... be 
made to foster the personal and social development of . . . students who are held 
accountable for violations of University regulations"). 
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society that sometimes gives the impression that virtues 
such as these are discretionary. These should be a part of 
the standard equipment of our graduates, not options. ' 52 
Interestingly, character, tolerance, civility, citizenship, and 
responsibility are the very values that students seem to be lacking 
when they engage in unruly fan behavior. Although the university 
may state that its purpose is to instill such values in its student body, 
the university's unwillingness to sternly address these problems 
makes it difficult to believe the genuineness of that statement. 53 
The relevant sections of the codes of conduct at the University of 
Maryland and the University of Oregon are used to demonstrate that 
fan behavior at basketball games seems to be an afterthought when 
developing student codes of conduct.54 For example, the only 
language in the University of Maryland's code that appears to address 
fan behavior states that a student's intentional and substantial 
interference "with the freedom of expression of others on University 
premises or at University-sponsored activities" is subject to 
disciplinary action. 55 Although this language could be applied to fan 
behavior, it serves no use when trying to curb poor fan behavior. 
Instead of sanctioning poor fan behavior, this language actually 
sanctions student conduct that would attempt to deter unruly fan 
behavior. 
Shortly following section 90) of the University of Maryland's 
Code of Student Conduct, section 9(m) seeks to promote a 
contradictory principle. 56 This section makes punishable student 
conduct on university premises or at university-sponsored activities 
that is "disorderly or disruptive" and "which interferes with the 
activities of others, including studying, teaching, research, and 
University administration."57 Section 9(m) is the only language in the 
university's code that could be applied to sanction poor fan behavior, 
52. See Office of Student Conduct: Division of Student Affairs, (discussing the purposes 
of the university's various codes for student conduct) (unpublished material, on file 
with author). 
53. See infra text accompanying notes 55-58. 
54. See infra text accompanying notes 55, 61. 
55. UMD Code of Conduct, supra note 51, at§ 9G). This language echoes the Court's 
material and substantial disruption test as articulated in Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1969). Under the 
material and substantial disruption test, the Court held that wearing black armbands to 
school during the Vietnam War would not "substantially interfere with the work ofthe 
school or impinge upon the rights of other students." Id at 509; see also Part III.A.l. 
56. See UMD Code of Conduct, supra note 51, at§ 9(m). 
57. Id 
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as the derogatory remarks regarding J .J. Redick's sisters could be 
seen as interfering with the University's ability to achieve its 
educational mission. 58 
The University of Oregon's Student Code of Conduct similarly 
neglects to directly address student conduct at sporting events. 59 The 
University of Oregon's code of conduct employs comparable 
language to the University of Maryland's code of conduct in the 
section most relevant to fan behavior.6° For example, under the 
"Violations of Community Standards by Individual Students" section 
of its code, the university states that students may be sanctioned for 
"[ e ]ngaging in behavior that could reasonably be foreseen to cause 
disruption of, obstruction of, or interference with the process of 
instruction, research, administration, student discipline, or any other 
service or activity provided or sponsored by the University."61 It 
seems that calling an opponent's family member a "whore," or 
holding a sign that negatively (and inaccurately) depicts his sexuality, 
could reasonably be seen as interfering with the process of instilling 
educational and societal values in students.62 
At the end of the day, fan behavior around the country is often 
deplorable.63 The codes of conduct discussed above, which barely 
address the issue, either inadequately deter such behavior or too often 
go unenforced at revenue-generating sports venues.64 The University 
of Maryland and the University of Oregon are certainly not alone in 
58. See supra Part !I.A. 
59. See Student Conduct Code, http://studentlife.uoregon.edu/studentconductand 
communitystandards/conductcode/tabid/69/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2009) 
[hereinafter UO Student Conduct Code]. 
60. See id.; see also UMD Code of Conduct, supra note 51. 
61. UO Student Conduct Code, supra note 59. The language in this section, like its 
counterpart in section 9(m) of the UMD Code of Conduct, supra note 51, also seems 
to be drawn from the Court's substantial disruption test articulated in Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
62. See Wahl, supra note 4 (discussing the Kevin Love incident at Oregon University). 
63. See Editorial, Georgia Tech Fan Behavior Absurd, HEIGHTS (Boston), Sept. 17, 2007, 
available at http ://media. www. bcheights.com/medialstorage/paper 144/news/2007 /09/ 
17/Editoriai/Georgia.Tech.Fan.Behavior.Absurd-2972398.shtml. Students threw 
water bottles at Boston College cheerleaders, forcing the referees to stop the game 
five times, and "fans chastised radio personality Jayme Parker, referring to her as a 
'slut,' telling her to go home, and using other graphic, demeaning, and crass 
language." /d. See also Eric Hoover, Crying Foul Over Fans' Boorish Behavior, 
CHRON. HIGHER Eouc. (Washington, D.C.) Apr. 9, 2004, at AI, available at 
http://chronicle.com/free /v50/i31/31a00101.htm (discussing incidents at the 
University ofKentucky, Iowa State University, and the University of Maryland). 
64. See Brand, supra note 7. 
338 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 39 
the fight. Thus, it is essential that universities join together to get a 
hold on this problem through well-crafted, constitutionally-sound 
policies banning unacceptable student conduct before it further 
infiltrates the college basketball environment. 
III. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS GOVERNING SPEECH IN 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
Admittedly, the Supreme Court has treated primary and secondary 
schools somewhat differently than public universities. The Court has 
often repeated its view that the "college classroom with its 
surrounding environs is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas. "'65 
However, as Part III.B points out, the Court has not clearly spoken as 
to whether policies of primary and secondary schools are to be 
treated differently than those of universities; in fact, some of the 
Court's language indicates that they are to be treated the same.66 
A. High School Speech Cases 
1. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District67 
Several student speech cases have reached the Court in the last 
forty years, beginning with Tinker. During the height of the Vietnam 
War, several students in a Des Moines school district agreed to 
protest the war by wearing black armbands to school. 68 Aware of the 
students' plans, the principals adopted a policy that any student 
wearing a black armband would be asked to remove it, and that if that 
student refused, he or she would be suspended until he or she 
returned without it.69 In accordance with the adopted policy, three 
students were suspended for their protest. 70 
The students brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the 
schools' policy, alleging a First Amendment violatioil. 71 The Court 
noted that the state, through school officials, may not justifiably 
prohibit student expression without showing "something more than a 
65. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972) (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 
U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). This has sometimes resulted in greater protection for students. 
66. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
67. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
68. /d. at 504. John Tinker, fifteen years old, and Christopher Eckhardt, sixteen years old, 
attended high schools in Des Moines. /d. Mary Beth Tinker, thirteen years old, 
attended junior high school in Des Moines. /d. 
69. /d. 
70. /d. The protest occurred in the middle of December. /d. The three students did not 
return to school until after New Year's Day. /d. 
71. /d. at 505. 
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mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always 
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.'.n It was in this context that the 
Court first established its "material and substantial disruption" test 
used in student speech cases. 73 Applying the test to the facts in 
Tinker, the Court found no evidence indicating that the wearing of 
armbands would "substantially interfere with the work of the school 
or impinge upon the rights of other students."74 Paramount to this 
conclusion was the determination that wearing armbands constituted 
a form of political speech through "silent, passive expression of 
opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on the part of 
petitioners."75 As a result, the Court struck down the schools' policy, 
sending the message that a student's freedom of speech rights do not 
disappear upon entering school. 76 
2. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser77 
In July 1986, the Court faced another school speech case involving 
a school's policy prohibiting certain student conduct.78 The school 
policy at issue in Fraser stated that "[ c ]onduct which materially and 
substantially interferes with the educational process is prohibited, 
including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures."79 The 
language of the policy clearly emanated from Tinker and 
encompassed the material and substantial disruption test,80 but went 
no further than prohibiting conduct clearly violative of Tinker. 81 
72. /d. at 509. 
73. See id. The test states that a public school may not burden a student's rights to 
freedom of expression so long as he expresses himself without '"materially and 
substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the 
operation of the school' and without colliding with the rights of others." /d. at 513 
(alteration in original) (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744,749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
74. /d. at 509. 
75. /d. at 508. Accordingly, the Court found there to be no evidence of petitioners' 
interference with the other students' rights or the schools' work. I d. 
76. /d. at 514. The policy was determined to be unconstitutional, and the Court 
articulated one of its more famous quotes, suggesting that schools may not be able to 
limit student speech: "It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed 
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 
/d. at 506. 
77. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
78. See id. at 677. 
79. /d. at 678. 
80. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
81. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678. The policy only prohibited obscene language which 
materially and substantially interfered with the educational process. This suggests 
that the policy did not prohibit obscene language that did not interfere with the 
310 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 39 
The respondent in Fraser, a public high school student in 
petitioner's school district, was disciplined under this policy for 
delivering a nomination speech during a school-wide assembly in 
which he referred to his candidate using an "elaborate, graphic, and 
explicit sexual metaphor."82 After admitting to his deliberate use of 
the sexual innuendo, the student was suspended for three days in 
accordance with the school's policy.83 Fraser brought suit alleging 
that the policy violated his First Amendment right to freedom of 
speech.84 
Although the Fraser Court certainly reflected upon Tinker, its 
ultimate approach deviated from Tinker's material and substantial 
disruption test. 85 It seemed that the Court was primarily concerned 
with the general purpose of schools in evaluating the policy at issue. 86 
The Court recognized the importance of tolerating different views, 
but it also recognized the need to balance this tolerance against the 
needs and sensibilities of fellow students.87 Essentially, the Court's 
balancing test weighed the school's interest in teaching students the 
"boundaries of socially appropriate behavior" and the school board's 
authority to determine what manner of speech is appropriate in school 
assemblies against the students' "undoubted freedom to advocate· 
unpopular and controversial views."88 Ultimately, the Court 
concluded: 
educational process, even though it could have done so as obscene expression was not 
protected speech. See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24, 36-37 (1973) 
(holding that expression which satisfies the three-prong test for obscenity is 
unprotected). The policy is a perfect example of the effect of Tinker and how schools 
believed the Court would closely scrutinize any policy limiting students' free 
expression. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678 (demonstrating that Bethel High School used 
the precise material and substantial interference language announced in Tinker in its 
prohibition against obscene language). 
82. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677-78. 
83. /d. 
84. /d. at 679. 
85. See id. at 68Q-81. 
86. Referring to the role and purpose of the public school system, the Court noted that 
'"[public education) must inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in 
themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-
government in the community and the nation."' !d. at 681 (quoting CHARLES BEARD 
& MARY BEARD, NEW BASICHISTORYOFTHE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)). 
87. !d. "[C)onstitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically 
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings." /d. at 682 (citing New Jersey 
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-42 (1985)). 
88. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681-83. 
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The process of educating our youth for citizenship in 
public schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and 
the civics class; schools must teach by example the shared 
values of a civilized social order. . . . The schools, as 
instruments of the state, may determine that the essential 
lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a 
school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and 
conduct .... 89 
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It became evident that a school's purpose would allow it to restrict 
student speech in ways that other governmental entities might not be 
able to restrict similar speech.90 In Fraser, the Court recognized that 
the First Amendment does not prevent schools from restricting vulgar 
and lewd speech when it reasonably believes permitting such speech 
would undermine the school's basic educational mission.91 
3. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier92 
Just two years after Fraser, the Court reexamined school speech 
regulations in Kuhlmeier. Staff members of a high school newspaper 
filed suit claiming that the school's censorship of certain articles 
violated their First Amendment rights.93 The students argued that the 
school paper constituted a public forum, and therefore, they were 
entitled to greater protection of the content that was published.94 
The Court's analysis in this case is relevant on two levels. First, 
the Court found that public schools are not traditional public forums 
unless designated as such by the school.95 In the case of the school 
paper in Kuhlmeier, the Court held that the school officials did not 
designate it as a public forum. 96 In so holding, the Court reiterated 
89. Id. at 683. 
90. See id. at 682; supra text accompanying notes 87-88. 
91. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685. "A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a 
sexually explicit monologue .... " Id. 
92. 484 u.s. 260 (1988). 
93. See id. 
94. See id. at 267. 
95. /d. "The public schools do not possess all of the attributes of streets, parks, and other 
traditional public forums that 'time out of mind, have been used for purposes of 
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions."' Id. (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). 
96. Id. at 270. The Court found that the school lacked the '"clear intent to create a public 
forum,"' which it had found to exist in other cases. Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP 
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)). But see Widmar v. 
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981) (finding that the university's consistent 
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that a state actor may only create a non-traditional forum when 
clearly intending to do so.97 
The second critical aspect ofthe Court's opinion is its reaffirmation 
of Tinker and Fraser, and its decision in favor of the school 
exercising editorial control of the student-published newspaper.98 
The Court held that "educators do not offend the First Amendment by 
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student 
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their 
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."99 
This relates back to the school's basic educational mission described 
in Fraser100 and indicates the Court's unwillingness to handicap 
schools in their pursuit of that educational mission. 101 
4. Morse v. Frederick102 
The Court's most recent student speech case, decided in 2007, 
involved a school principal that suspended a student for displaying a 
controversial sign during an off-campus, school-sponsored event. 103 
The principal believed that the sign violated a local school board 
policy specifically prohibiting expression that advocated "the use of 
substances that are illegal to minors."104 Relying on Tinker, Fraser, 
and Hazelwood, the Court held that "schools may take steps to 
accommodation of student organizations by reserving meeting rooms indicated an 
intentional creation of a forum generally open for use by student groups); City of 
Madison, Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 
167, 174-75 (1976) (finding that the state designated a public forum by holding 
school board meetings open to the general public). 
97. See Kuh/meier, 484 U.S. at 267. The import of the classification as a public forum 
will be addressed in Part IV. 
98. See id. at 271-73. 
99. !d. at 273. 
1 00. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text. 
101. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273. "It is only when the decision to censor a school-
sponsored publication, theatrical production, or other vehicle of student expression 
has no valid educational purpose that the First Amendment is so 'directly and sharply 
implicate[d],' as to require judicial intervention to protect students' constitutional 
rights." !d. (alteration in original) (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 
(1968)). 1n a subsequent footnote, the Court expressly reserved the decision as to 
whether the same degree of deference is appropriate at the college and university 
level. !d. at 273 n.7. 
102. 551 u.s. 393 (2007). 
103. !d. at 396. During an approved class trip, student Joseph Frederick held a fourteen-
foot banner which read '"BONG HITS 4 JESUS'" at the Olympic Torch Relay while 
fellow students looked on. !d. at 397. 
I 04. !d. at 398. 
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safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can 
reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use." 105 
Perhaps more relevant than the holding in Morse is the Court's 
discussion of Tinker and Fraser, and how the Court resolved those 
cases differently. The Court acknowledged the unclear mode of 
analysis used in Fraser, but recognized the clear difference between 
the "'political "message" of the armbands in Tinker and the sexual 
content of [Fraser's] speech. "'106 Further, the Court stated that "[h]ad 
Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum outside the school 
context, it would have been protected."107 Since it was evident that 
Tinker's material and substantial disruption test was not employed in 
Fraser, the Morse Court acknowledged that Tinker's test is not 
absolute. 108 Accordingly, the school in Fraser was justified in 
restricting otherwise protected speech when considered "in light of 
the special characteristics of the school."109 
Likewise, the Morse Court considered the special nature of the 
school environment in determining that Frederick's wielding of the 
controversial banner was justifiably sanctioned. 110 Although the 
Court recognized the important government interest in limiting 
speech reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use to students, 
the Court's ultimate conclusion was that "[t]he First Amendment 
does not require schools to tolerate at school events student 
expression that contributes to [the dangers of illegal drug use]." 111 It 
is impossible to disregard the Court's overwhelming sense of the 
school's purpose in this decision. 112 At its core, Morse is in line with 
Fraser and Kuhlmeier in its relaxed approach toward student speech, 
105. /d. at 396-97. 
106. /d. at 404 (alteration in original) (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680). 
107. /d. at 405 (referencing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16-18 (1971) (holding that 
the conviction of a defendant for disturbing the peace by wearing a jacket bearing 
words "'Fuck the Draft"' at a local courthouse violated his freedom of speech rights)). 
108. Morse, 551 U.S. at 393, 405. ln addition, Kuhlmeier effectively confirmed that the 
material and substantial disruption test from Tinker is not absolute when it allowed the 
school to exercise control over the style and content of the school paper even though 
student control would not have substantially and materially disrupted the work of the 
school. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 272-73. Therefore, schools may limit student 
expression even when it does not substantially and materially disrupt the work of the 
school. See id. 
109. Morse, 551 U.S. at 405. 
110. /d. at 408--09. 
111. /d. at 410 (emphasis added). 
112. See id. at 408--09. 
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which often allows for schools to regulate otherwise protected speech 
based on their unique role and purpose in society. 113 
B. Student Speech Cases at the University Level 
There is great debate regarding the scope of the decisions discussed 
above and whether they should be extended to public university 
campuses. 114 Advocates of unfettered speech, such as Foundation for 
Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), 115 have historically argued 
that the student speech precedents do not apply with equal force to 
institutions of higher learning. 116 Conversely, universities 
consistently argue that the high school speech standard applies to 
public universities as well. 117 
Supreme Court decisions have inadequately addressed the issue. 
On one side, cases like Healy v. James 118 and Papish v. Board of 
Curators of the University of Missouri 119 seem to imply that policies 
infringing upon student speech will be treated differently at the 
college level. 120 At the same time, the Court's discussion eight years 
113. See id at 405-06, 409. 
114. Sean Clark, Bong Hits and Bright Lines, July 5, 2007, http://www.thefire.org/index. 
php/article/820 l.htrnl. 
115. FIRE's mission is to protect students' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights at 
America's colleges and universities. See About Fire, Sept. 2, 2004, 
http://www.thefire.org/index.php/article/4 8 5l.html. 
116. Press Release, FIRE, Victory for Free Speech as Third Circuit Issues Ruling Against 
Temple University (Aug. 4, 2008), http://www.thefire.org/index.php/article/9573. 
html. William Creeley, FIRE's Director of Legal and Public Advocacy, noted that 
college students are entitled to full First Amendment protection and stated that 
'"attempts to equate the rights of high school students with those of college students 
are without merit."' Jd 
117. See Clark, supra note 114. When discussing the potential impact of Morse, former 
FIRE President David French said, "the university's first line of defense is the high 
school speech standard. When high school student rights shrink, universities grow 
bolder." 
118. 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (holding that the burden was on a college administration to 
justify the rejection of a college organization's application for recognition if the 
student organization complied with the campus filing requirements). 
119. 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (holding that a state university's expulsion of a graduate student 
because of disapproved content of a newspaper, which the student distributed on 
campus, could not be justified as a nondiscriminatory application of reasonable rules 
governing conduct). 
120. See Healy, 408 U.S. at 180-81 (involving members of a registered religious group at a 
state university who challenged a university policy that excluded religious groups 
from the university's open forum policy whereby university facilities were generally 
available for activities of registered student groups) ("The college classroom with its 
surrounding environs is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas,' and we break no new 
constitutional ground in reaffirming this Nation's dedication to safeguarding academic 
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later m Widmar v. Vincent121 indicates otherwise. While 
acknowledging Healy's statement that the college classroom is a 
prime location for the marketplace of ideas, the Court stated that "[a] 
university's mission is education, and decisions of this Court have 
never denied a university's authority to impose reasonable 
regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus 
and facilities." 122 This seems to indicate that in fulfilling its 
educational mission, a public university is granted similar leeway in 
regulating student speech, as are secondary schools. 123 
C. Key Factors 
Although the Court has not readily distinguished between the level 
of First Amendment protection afforded to high school students and 
that afforded to college students, several important considerations 
remain constant in student speech cases at all levels. On the one 
hand, the Court always recognizes the powerful protections of the 
First Amendment. 124 In each of the decisions discussed above, the 
Court noted that while the rights of students are not always the same 
as those of adults in other settings, they still exist within the confines 
of the school. Quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 125 the Healy Court stated 
that "'[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere 
more vital than in the community of American schools. "'126 
freedom."); see also Papish, 410 U.S. at 670 ("[Healy] makes it clear that the mere 
dissemination of ideas-no matter how offensive to good taste--on a state university 
campus [sic] may not be shut off in the name alone of'conventions of decency.'"). 
121. 454 U.S. 263, 268 (1981). The Court cited to Tinker to support the argument that 
"First Amendment rights of speech and association extend to the campuses of state 
universities." Jd. at 268-69. The fact that Tinker is used to protect college students' 
free speech rights indicates that the Court sees the case as universally applicable to 
school speech cases, regardless of the setting. 
122. Jd. at 268 n.S. 
123. See id. (explaining that while universities have many characteristics of a public forum, 
courts must consider the unique characteristics of a school environment when 
analyzing First Amendment rights); see also Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 735-36 
(7th Cir. 2005) (applying Hazelwood to a public university speech case). 
124. See supra Part liLA-B. 
125. 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (finding that a state statute requiring teachers in public 
schools to file affidavits giving names of all organizations to which they had belonged 
to or contributed to within the preceding fives years as a perquisite to employment 
was unconstitutional because it deprived the teachers of the right of associational 
freedom). 
126. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (alteration in original). A critical aspect of 
this quote is that it was made in the context of discussing college classrooms, the 
primary setting for academic discourse. It should hardly be argued that the "vigilant 
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However, most important in every student speech case is the 
Court's consideration of the school's basic educational mission. 127 
Decisions involving student speech are always considered "in light of 
the special characteristics of the school."128 It certainly appears that 
the Court is much more likely to uphold a public university policy 
when that policy furthers the university's educational mission by 
limiting speech which undermines that mission. 129 Similarly, the 
concern for civility and acceptable social behavior leans in favor of 
allowing a university to restrict certain speech. 130 
IV. PUBLIC FORUM ANALYSIS 
After determining that public universities are unique government 
entities for the purposes of a constitutional analysis, it is imperative 
to address the nature of the forum of a college basketball game. 
Some would argue that even after conceding that universities are 
special and that they have a greater ability to restrict speech, they still 
cannot do so at basketball games because the universities' various 
stadiums and arenas constitute public forums. 131 However, a closer 
look at Supreme Court decisions reveals that basketball arenas on 
public campuses are not public forums, even though expressive 
activity does occur within their confines. 
A. Defining the Forum 
Although the Court is more deferential to public school policies 
than it is to those of other state actors, it would still have to classify 
university stadiums and arenas as a specific type of forum before 
analyzing the relevant university policies. 132 A long line of decisions 
indicates that a forum may be classified as (1) a traditional public 
protection of constitutional freedoms" is as vital at the university's basketball game as 
it is during a classroom debate. !d. Such an argument implies that it is equally 
important to protect a student's right to shout profanity and sexual slurs as it is to 
protect a student's right to disagree with a professor. 
127. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). 
128. See Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
129. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 n.5 (1981 ). 
130. See Papish v. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 672 (1973) (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting). 
131. Wasserman, supra note 2, at 529-30. "At one end is a state university controlling 
student-fan speech in its arena, a state actor plainly bound by the limitations of the 
First Amendment." /d. 
132. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983) 
("[T]he standard by which limitations upon [a right of access to public property for 
expressive purposes] must be evaluated differ [sic] depending on the character of the 
property at issue."). 
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forum, (2) a public forum created by government designation, or (3) a 
nonpublic forum. 133 As indicated in Perry Education Association v. 
Perry Local Educuators' Association, 134 the Court's classification of 
a particular forum will determine the degree to which citizens are 
shielded from state regulations within that forum. 135 
The first type of forum is a traditional public forum. 136 The Court 
considers places like streets, parks, and other "places which by long 
tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and 
debate," to be traditional public forums. 137 As such, regulations 
within these forums are subject to strict scrutiny review, which 
requires the state to demonstrate that any regulations on speech in 
these forums serve a compelling state interest and are narrowly drawn 
to achieve that interest. 138 Because of the unique nature of traditional 
public forums and the history that accompanies them, 139 one would be 
hard-pressed to argue that basketball arenas constitute traditional 
public forums. 140 
B. Designated Public Forum v. Nonpublic Forum 
The more important debate is whether these arenas should be 
classified as designated public forums or nonpublic forums. This 
determination is critical because it would prove to be the difference 
between the Court enabling universities to limit certain forms of 
speech or prohibiting such limitations. 141 If classified as a designated 
public forum, universities would be bound by the same rules 
133. See id. at 45-46; see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 
u.s. 788, 802 (1985). 
134. 460 U.S. 37. 
135. See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46 ("Public property which is not by tradition or 
designation a forum for public communication is governed by different standards."). 
136. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. 
137. Perry Educ. Ass 'n, 460 U.S. at 45. Places like streets and parks '"have immemorially 
been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used for 
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing 
public questions."' !d. (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 
(1939)). 
138. Perry Educ. Ass 'n, 460 U.S. at 45. 
139. See Hague, 307 U.S. at 515-16 (discussing historical assembly at streets and parks). 
140. Basketball arenas have not historically been used for discussing public questions and 
do not fall within the ambit of a traditional public forum under the Perry description. 
See Perry Educ. Ass 'n, 460 U.S. at 45. 
141. See id. at 45-46. Discussing designated public forums, the Court stated that 
"[a]lthough a state is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the 
facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional 
public forum." !d. 
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regarding traditional public forums. 142 Conversely, if the arenas were 
determined to be nonpublic forums, the universities would be able to 
reasonably regulate speech, as long as the regulations are viewpoint 
neutral 143 and are "not an effort to suppress expression merely 
because public officials oppose the speaker's view." 144 
There are several factors that the Court considers when determining 
whether a forum is a designated public forum. 145 The Court has 
looked to see whether the government has designated the place for 
"use by the public at large for assembly and speech, for use by certain 
speakers, or for the discussion of certain subjects."146 
The Court has also noted however: 
The government does not create a public forum by 
inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by 
intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public 
discourse. Accordingly, the Court has looked to the policy 
and practice of the government to ascertain whether it 
intended to designate a place not traditionally open to 
assembly and debate as a public forum. 147 
This suggests, and case law supports, the notion that state actors must 
"evidence[] a clear intent to create a public forum." 148 For example, 
the Court found that a state university's express policy of opening its 
meeting facilities to registered student groups created a public forum 
open for use by all student groups. 149 The Court found that the 
university evidenced a clear intent to create a public forum through 
its express policy of allowing student groups to convene and discuss 
their issues. 150 
The Court reached a similar outcome in Southeastern Promotions, 
Ltd. v. Conrad. 151 The Court found that members of the municipal 
142. See id. In designated public forums, state actors may only adopt reasonable time, 
place, and manner regulations. Id. As in traditional public forums, content-based 
restrictions will only be upheld upon a showing that the regulation is narrowly drawn 
to serve a compelling state interest. I d. 
143. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985). 
144. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46 (citing U.S. Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic 
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 131 n.7 (1981)). 
145. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. 
146. Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45-46 n.7). 
147. I d. (referencing in part Perry Educ. Ass 'n, 460 U.S. at 47) (emphasis added). 
148. !d. 
149. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,267 (1981). 
150. /d. 
151. 420U.S.546(1975). 
2010) Keep It Clean 319 
board responsible for managing a city auditorium violated a 
promoter's rights when they rejected the promoter's application to 
perform a controversial play in the theatre. 152 After determining that 
the board's unchecked power of reviewing all applications 
constituted a prior restraint, 153 the Court recognized the theatre as a 
public forum. 154 Certain language contained in the original 
dedication booklet stated: 
'It will be [the board's] endeavor to make [the auditorium] 
the community center of Chattanooga; where civic, 
educational[,] religious, patriotic and charitable 
organizations and associations may have a common meeting 
place to discuss and further the upbuilding and general 
welfare of the city and surrounding territory. 
It will not be operated for profit, and no effort to obtain 
financial returns above the actual operating expenses will be 
permitted. Instead its purpose will be devoted for cultural 
advancement, and for clean, healthful, entertainment which 
will make for the upbuilding of a better citizenship.' 155 
Interpreting this language, the Court determined that the 
auditoriums under the board's control were "designed for and 
dedicated to expressive activities" and consequently functioned as 
public forums. 156 
It seems therefore that to consider a place to be a designated public 
forum merely because it is open to "expressive activity" is to 
discredit the importance of the term "discourse" and the nature of a 
public forum. 157 The auditoriums in Southeastern Promotions were 
certainly open to expressive activity, yet were considered public 
forums based on their expressed purpose in their dedication 
152. See id. at 552 ("[R]espondents' rejection of petitioner's application to use this public 
forum accomplished a prior restraint under a system lacking in constitutionally 
required minimal procedural safeguards."). 
153. /d. 
154. /d. at 555. 
155. /d. at 549 n.4 (alterations in original) (quoting SOUVENIER OF DEDICATION OF 
SOLDIERS AND SAILORS MEMORIAL AUDITORIUM 40 (1924)). 
156. /d. at 555. 
157. Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines "discourse" to be a "verbal interchange of 
ideas," and likens it to a "conversation." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 357 (llth ed. 2004). Another defmition describes it as "formal and 
orderly and usually extended expression of thought on a subject." /d. 
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booklets. 158 Each of the above cases, along with the Court's 
language, 159 indicates that something more is required. 160 A plain 
reading of the Court's language leads to the conclusion that a state 
actor must intentionally open a nontraditional public forum for public 
conversation, if not debate, if it is to be considered a designated 
public forum. 161 
C. Public Places Considered Nonpublic Forums 
By itself, the fact that a place is suitable for expression is not 
enough. The Court has rejected the argument that "whenever 
members of the public are permitted freely to visit a place owned or 
operated by the Government, then that place becomes a 'public 
forum' for purposes of the First Amendment."162 Any belief that a 
public place owned by the government is automatically a public 
forum was discredited in United States v. Kokinda, 163 where the Court 
held that a sidewalk on postal property was not a traditional public 
forum. 164 
Kokinda presents an interesting wrinkle in constitutional law. As 
stated above, public streets have long been held to be traditional 
public forums, places that "time out of mind" have been used for 
public debate. 165 Yet the Court looked to the purpose of this 
particular sidewalk to determine whether it deserved traditional 
public forum protection. 166 The Court concluded that the postal 
158. 420 U.S. at 549 n.4. The auditorium was considered "a common meeting place to 
discuss" issues central to the community, not simply a place open to expressive 
activity. !d. (quoting SOUVENIER, supra note 155). 
159. As stated above, the Court has found that mere inaction or permitting limited 
discourse does not evidence a clear intent to open a nontraditional public forum for 
public discourse. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 
788, 802 (1985). 
160. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264-65 (1981) (school adopted express policy 
of opening its facilities for use by student groups); see also Se. Promotions, 420 U.S. 
at 549 n.4 (expressed purpose of the auditorium was to allow for "civic, educational[,] 
religious, patriotic and charitable organizations and associations [to] have a common 
meeting place to discuss and further the upbuilding and general welfare of the city"). 
161. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (interpreting the word "discourse" in accordance with 
its dictionary definition). 
162. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976). 
163. 497 U.S. 720 (1990). 
164. See id. at 730 (analyzing the Postal Service's sidewalks under nonpublic forum 
standards). 
165. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
166. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727 (recognizing that the sidewalk lacked the characteristics 
associated with other sidewalks inviting expression including openness, congestion, 
and a relaxed environment where people could enjoy one another). 
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sidewalk, "constructed solely to provide for the passage of 
individuals engaged in postal business," was not the type of sidewalk 
afforded strict review. 167 
Furthermore, the argument that individuals and groups had been 
permitted to leaflet, speak, and picket on those premises was to no 
avail. 168 The Court stated that permitting limited discourse does not 
create a public forum; instead, as stated throughout, the government 
must intentionally open that forum for public discourse. 169 In the end, 
the case represents an important concept in constitutional forum 
analysis: the purpose of a government-owned forum is more critical 
to the analysis than what may occur inside that forum. 170 
The Court relied on this purpose-oriented approach in determining 
the nature of the forum in lnt 'l Soc y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. 
v. Lee, 171 where it held that an airport terminal, though freely open to 
all members of the public, was a nonpublic forum under the First 
Amendment. 172 Petitioners (ISKCON) alleged that the Port 
Authority's policy prohibiting solicitation in the terminal should be 
struck down under the Court's strict scrutiny review of government 
regulations of public forums. 173 In response, the Court stated that "a 
traditional public forum is property that has as 'a principal 
purpose ... the free exchange of ideas. "'174 Relying on Kokinda, the 
Court determined that because the airport functioned primarily as a 
commercial establishment, its principal purpose was not to promote 
the free exchange of ideas. 175 Absent such a purpose, the airport 
terminal had to be considered a nonpublic forum. 176 
167. See id. at 727. "[T]he location and purpose of a publicly owned sidewalk is critical to 
determining whether such a sidewalk constitutes a public forum." !d. at 728-29. But 
cf United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (holding that the sidewalk surrounding 
the Supreme Court building was a traditional public forum). 
168. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730. 
169. /d. (relying on Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 
802 (1985)). 
170. See supra text accompanying notes 16()...{)3. 
171. 505 u.s. 672 (1992). 
172. See id. at 679. 
173. See id. at 677-78. 
174. !d. at 679 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800). 
175. /d. at 682 (noting that airports are designed to make a regulated profit); see also 
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990) ("Where the government is acting 
as a proprietor, managing its internal operations, rather than acting as lawmaker with 
the power to regulate or license, its action will not be subjected to the heightened 
review to which its actions as a lawmaker may be subject."). 
176. See ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 682. 
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These cases emphasize that not all publicly owned properties 
capable of supporting expressive activity are considered public 
forums. Together, Perry Education Association, Widmar, 
Southeastern Promotions, Kokinda, and ISKCON indicate that the 
Court places great importance on the reason a particular forum exists 
when characterizing that forum. 177 
D. The Basketball Arena on a Public Campus: A Nonpublic Forum 
Many assume that as part of a public university campus, a 
university's basketball arena is undoubtedly a designated public 
forum. 178 They assume that the university "intentionally invites fans 
to fill the stands for specifically expressive purposes."179 Still, what 
is consistently overlooked in these examinations of collegiate 
sporting events is the true purpose underlying these invitations to the 
public: money. 180 
In October 2002, the University of Maryland and the Maryland 
Stadium Authority finished construction of the Comcast Center, 
177. See supra Part IV.B-C. 
178. See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 2, at 539 ("There is no question that a state 
university is bound by the First Amendment in attempting to regulate fan 
expression."). Although Professor Wasserman never expressly attributes this 
statement to classifying the arena as a public forum, such an inference can be made. 
See id. 
179. See Howard M. Wasserman, Cheers, Profanity, and Free Speech, 31 J.C. & U.L. 377, 
387 (2005) (referencing Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum-From 
Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58 OHIO Sr. L.J. 1535, 1570 (1998) and Calvin Massey, 
Public Fora, Neutral Governments, and the Prism of Property, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 309, 
321-22 (1999)). But cf Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976) (rejecting the 
principle that a government-operated place becomes a public forum whenever 
members of the public are permitted to visit). 
180. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972) (recognizing that a sports arena, 
like a shopping center or an office building, serves the public for commercial 
purposes); see also Peter J. Schwartz, The Most Valuable College Basketball Teams, 
FORBES, Jan. 2, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/2007/12/27/college-basketball-
valuations-biz-sports _ cz js _ 0 102basketball.htrnl (discussing the net value of several 
prominent men's college basketball programs); Bradley S. Pensyl, Note, Whistling a 
Foul on the NCAA: How NCAA Recruiting Bylaws Violate the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act, 58 SYRACUSE L. REv. 397, 410 (2008) (citing CBS Renews NCAA B'ball, CNN 
MONEY, Nov. 18, 1999, http://money.cnn.com/1999/ll/18/news/ncaal) (discussing a 
1999 contract that CBS and the NCAA entered into, totaling $6 billion over eleven 
years); Douglas Bryant, Comment, A Level Playing Field? The NCAA's Freshman 
Eligibility Standards Violate Title VI, But The Problems Can Be Solved, 32 TEx. TECH 
L. REv. 305, 305-06 (2001) (discussing college sports as a lucrative business, and 
intercollegiate athletics as revolving around money). 
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successor to the long-revered Cole Field House. 181 The project to 
erect the new arena, with an estimated budget over $125 million, 
resulted in a state-of-the-art facility capable of housing nearly 18,000 
spectators. 182 
If it is difficult to understand why the University of Maryland 
would commit so much money to the development of a new 
basketball arena when the Cole Field House was recognized as one of 
the great college basketball environments in the country, look no 
further than Peter Schwartz's article in Forbes magazine. 183 In the 
article, Schwartz lists the estimated values of the twenty most 
valuable men's basketball programs, as well as the profits those 
teams posted in 2007. 184 The University of North Carolina ranked 
first in the country, estimated to be worth $26 million after posting a 
$16.9 million profit in 2007. 185 They were followed by fifth-ranked 
Duke, worth $22.6 million after an $11.2 million profit in 2007, and 
thirteenth-ranked North Carolina State, worth $13.6 million after a 
$7.9 million profit that same year. 186 Right behind those universities, 
ranking fourth in the ACC and seventeenth nationally, was the 
University of Maryland, with an estimated value of $13.1 million 
after posting a $7.3 million profit in 2007. 187 
This perspective is critical for an effective forum analysis of public 
university basketball arenas. As demonstrated in ISKCON, the fact 
that a place may be open to the public and capable of supporting 
expressive activity does not automatically render that place a public 
forum. 188 Like the airport in ISKCON, "designed to make a regulated 
181. University of Maryland Comcast Center, http://www.mdstad.com (Follow 
"Completed Projects" hyperlink, then follow "University of Maryland College Park-
Comcast Center" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 18, 2009). 
182. See id. 
183. See Schwartz, supra note 180. 
184. See id. 
185. Jd. 
186. Jd. 
187. Jd. Team values were calculated based on what the basketball programs contributed 
to four different beneficiaries: (l) their university, including money that was used for 
academic purposes; (2) their athletic department (net profit generated by the program 
that was retained by the department); (3) their conference; and (4) their local 
communities, considering the spending by visitors to the county that was attributable 
to the program. See id. 
188. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 682-83 (1992) 
(noting that the purpose of airport terminals is to meet needs rather than support 
expressive activity). 
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profit,"189 the Comcast Center at the University of Maryland operates 
to that same end. 190 In addition to seating 3,000 more people than its 
predecessor, Cole Field House, the Comcast Center has three times 
the number of concession stands and a team store that never existed 
at Cole. 191 On top of that, the University sold the naming rights to the 
arena for $25 million. 192 When considering the incredible value and 
profitability of men's basketball programs, in conjunction with 
massive stadium construction, it is nearly impossible to misconstrue 
the nature of a college basketball game; more than anything, it is an 
enormous revenue-generating event. 193 
The fact that fans have been permitted to engage in expressive 
activity does not render the purpose of the arena meaningless. 194 As 
the Court made clear in Kokinda, permitting limited discourse does 
not create a public forum. 195 Like the sidewalk in Kokinda, 196 and the 
airport terminal in ISKCON, 197 the basketball arena was created for a 
purpose other than supporting public debate, though limited discourse 
may occur within. After considering the amount of money involved 
189. /d. at 682 (emphasis added). 
190. See Schwartz, supra note 180. 
191. See Welcome to the Comcast Center! http://umterps.cstv.com/school-bio/md-
comcast-center.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2009). 
192. See Comcast Exercises Option to Include Floor Naming Rights in New Arena, July 
12,2000, http://www.umterps.com/genrel/071200aaa.html ("By exercising the option, 
Comcast's naming rights gift has increased from $20 million to $25 million, making it 
the largest known corporate naming gift in the United States for a collegiate athletic 
facility."). 
193. See, e.g., Comcast Center A-Z Information Guide, http://www.umterps.com/sports/m-
baskbl/spec-rel/101404aad.htrnl (last visited Sept. 20, 2009). Indicative of the 
revenue-generating purpose of the basketball arena, the Comcast Center guide 
contains information on concessions, corporate sponsorships, do~ations, group ticket 
sales, mascot appearances, merchandise, program sales, rental information, season 
tickets, suites, summer camps, tours of Comcast Center, and University of Maryland 
catering. /d. 
194. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 728-30 (1990) (finding that although 
expression was permissive, "[t]he postal sidewalk was constructed solely to assist 
postal patrons to negotiate the space between the parking lot and the front door of the 
post office," and thus incidental expression did not create a public forum); see also 
Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270 (1988) (finding that a 
school paper did not constitute a public forum, though student expression was 
permitted therein). 
195. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730 (concluding that the postal sidewalk, unlike most 
sidewalks given traditional public forum protection, was constructed to provide for 
passage of individuals engaged in postal business, and therefore was not even a 
designated public forum). 
196. /d. 
197. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,683 (1992). 
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in the support and promotion of college basketball, the unmistakable 
commercial purpose underlying the spectacle likens the analysis to 
the Court's approach in ISKCON, and leads to the similar conclusion 
that the college basketball arena is a nonpublic forum. 
V. PROBLEMATIC EXPRESSION 
Even after recognizing that public universities can constitutionally 
limit expression in basketball arenas, it is important to note that most 
expression would be unaffected by a university's implementation of a 
fan behavior policy. For example, while some political speech198 
occasionally takes place within the arena, 199 it has not created the 
same level of controversy that other types of expression have created. 
And while there are other forms of expression that neither send a 
political message nor resort to profane or lewd language, the 
epicenter of the problem involves student expression laced with 
profanity, sexual innuendo, and derogatory slurs.200 
Despite the long line of student speech and public forum cases, 
some commentators have argued that Cohen is controlling and thus 
allows students to profanely and lewdly insult opposing students and 
families. 201 However, the analogy is inapposite. Granting that Cohen 
stands for the principle that '"government may not prohibit or punish 
198. As the Court said in Virginia v. Black, political speech is at the core of the First 
Amendment. 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003). This Comment does not seek to propose 
restrictions on political speech primarily because the Court has made clear that such 
restrictions are generally impermissible. However, political speech has not presented 
the same problems as have offensive forms of student speech. 
199. See, e.g., Theresa Vargas, All the Hoos in Hooville Hit With a Sign of the Times, 
WASH. PosT, Aug. 21, 2008, at B08, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp 
-dyn/content/article/2008/08/20/ AR200808200 1297 .html (discussing the University 
of Virginia's temporary ban on signs following intense public scrutiny of head coach 
AI Groh). 
200. See supra Part I. 
201. See Wasserman, supra note 2, at 571-72. Professor Wasserman reminds that Cohen 
represents the attitude that a speaker's choice of words are essential elements to the 
overall message and "government cannot prohibit certain words without also 
suppressing certain messages or ideas in the process." Jd. at 572. However, as 
discussed throughout this Comment, the rules are different for schools and public 
universities. The government, through the school, was allowed to punish the student 
in Fraser for delivering a speech laced with sexual-innuendo, despite the possibility 
that the words may have been necessary to deliver the intended message. See Bethel 
Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1986); see also Tiffany, supra 
note 26, at 119 (stating that any state university has a tough battle to overcome the 
Cohen test of strict scrutiny when restricting speech at athletic events). 
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speech simply because others might find it offensive, "'202 universities 
are still not precluded from prohibiting student profanity. By 
punishing students who scream "Fuck You, [player],"203 or call a 
visiting player's grandmother a "whore,"204 the university is doing 
much more than simply punishing objectionable speech; the 
university is fulfilling its mandates. 205 
Precedent established outside of the educational stratosphere 
should not trap universities. Although the Court has found profanity 
to be sometimes protected as valuable speech under the Cohen 
scenario/06 should the same rules apply to effectively require a 
university to permit behavior that undermines its mission in assisting 
students to become educated, moral, and ethical society members? 
Suppose that in the classroom, where the vigilant protection of 
students' expression is most vital, 207 a student used profanity or a 
lewd remark to express disagreement with a classmate's opinion. If 
applying the Cohen ideology-that the language is essential to 
communicating the intended thought-the students' remarks would 
probably be protected under Tinker's material and substantial 
disruption test. 208 If the profanity and lewdness are considered 
valuable speech under Cohen, it would be difficult to determine that 
protected expression to be a material and substantial disruption of the 
university's activities. 
Yet there is little doubt that such behavior would result in the 
student's removal from class and potential disciplinary actions. 
Under Fraser, the Court would balance the student's interest in 
expression against the university's interest in teaching students the 
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior/09 and would likely 
uphold the disciplinary sanctions as it did when such remarks 
occurred in a school assembly. 210 Although Cohen has professed that 
particular words should be protected because they are sometimes 
necessary to achieve the intended message, this rationale just simply 
202. See Tiffany, supra note 26, at 119 (citing Erwin Chemerinsky, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 999 (2d ed. 2002)). 
203. See Brady, supra note 3: 
204. See Wahl, supra note 4. 
205. See UMD Mission Statement, supra note 41. 
206. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). Referring to the language on 
Cohen's jacket, Justice Harlan stated that "while the particular four-letter word being 
litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is 
nevertheless often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric." /d. 
207. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972). 
208. See Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1969). 
209. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,681 (1986). 
21 0. See id. at 685-86 
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has not been and should not be applied in the school setting.211 Why 
should a university be handcuffed because the expression occurs in a 
different campus building?212 
The simple truth is that a student can effectively cheer for his or her 
team, or against an opposing team, without needing to resort to 
profane and lewd expression. The practical difference between the 
content of the messages "J.J. stinks"213 and "Fuck J.J." is trivial; a fan 
who shouts either succeeds in demonstrating his dislike for the 
player. While the minute difference between the two may be 
justifiable in the Cohen setting, it is a great hindrance on the 
university's educational mission to require the university to support 
intolerable expression in the basketball arena that would be properly 
disciplinable elsewhere. 214 
VI. COMPETING INTERESTS: STUDENTS VERSUS 
UNNERSITIES 
Having established that universities may place reasonable 
restrictions on profane and lewd speech within the basketball arena, it 
is important to address the competing interests involved in creating 
such restrictions. Developing adequate policies that simultaneously 
adhere to constitutional safeguards and sanction certain behavior has 
been a difficult undertaking for public universities. Universities have 
been unable to find the proper balance between allowing student 
expression and disallowing certain expression that contradicts their 
educational missions.215 Along with freedom of expression, 
universities must also consider the students' interest in the 
administration having limited discretion over the development and 
enforcement of potential policies. At the same time, a central 
211. See id. (finding that Fraser's lewd remarks were not necessary to achieve the intended 
message). 
212. See id. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan noted that "[i]f [Fraser] had 
given the same speech outside of the school environment, he could not have been 
penalized simply because [school] officials considered his language to be 
inappropriate." !d. But because Fraser's speech occurred within the school 
environment, the Court ruled in the government's favor. See id. This logically 
extends to the college basketball arena, one of the most prevalent and notable school 
environments on college campuses. 
213. In the sporting context, saying someone "stinks" indicates he is extremely bad. Usage 
is in accordance with a definition listed under "stink" in the dictionary. MERRIAM-
WEBSTER's COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1226 (11th ed. 2004). 
214. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
215. See id. at 681. The Court recognized the difficult task of balancing student expression 
against educational purposes. !d. 
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purpose of any public university is to develop viable community 
members. 216 Any policy addressing fan behavior must give due 
consideration to each of these interests. 
A. Student Interests 
1. Freedom of Expression 
This Comment has relied on the premise that a university's 
educational mission allows it to regulate speech in a way that other 
governmental entities cannot. For instance, the Court has made it 
clear that while students in public schools do not "shed their 
constitutional rights,"217 those rights do not automatically allow for 
student expression that would undermine a school's basic educational 
mission.218 Allowing fan behavior during a school-sponsored 
activity, like the behavior discussed in Part I of this Comment, can 
only serve to undermine the university's educational mission. 219 
Although the Court has upheld the First Amendment rights of adults 
to utilize profanity as a form of expression in some settings, 220 it has 
often rejected the rights of students to do the same. 221 
Further, while there may be a case for allowing vulgar expression 
in a classroom debate, logic dictates that the same form of expression 
is not as valuable at a basketball arena when it is used to derogatorily 
address opposing players and their families. 222 As discussed 
throughout, universities have been afforded the right to reasonably 
restrict speech that undermines their missions, and a student calling a 
visiting player's grandmother a "whore" does just that. 223 Allowing 
such behavior sends the message to students that verbal abuse is 
acceptable. A university cannot stand by idly and send this message, 
and at the same time satisfactorily accomplish its mission to nourish 
216. See supra Part II. 
217. Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
218. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685 (finding that the First Amendment does not prevent schools 
from restricting vulgar and lewd speech at a school assembly). 
219. See supra Part I. 
220. See generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16-18 (noting that the defendant wore 
the jacket as a means of informing the public of his disapproval of the draft and the 
Vietnam War). 
221. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681, 685-86 (recognizing that it was highly appropriate for a 
public school to prohibit vulgarity and other offensive terms in public discourse). 
222. One could argue that expression similar to Cohen's jacket, 403 U.S. at 16, is 
important to the learning process in a college classroom, where the vigilant protection 
of the marketplace for ideas is required, and therefore furthers the university's 
educational mission. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972). 
223. See Wahl, supra note 4. 
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student thought and help develop creative and ethical society 
members.224 Unfortunately, university inaction implicitly condones 
this sort of behavior and contributes, to a degree, to the university's 
failure to fully satisfy its mandates. 
Still, students are unequivocally entitled to a certain level of 
protection.225 The purpose of this section is not to argue for the 
general censorship of distasteful language, but rather to appeal to the 
moral and ethical dilemma of allowing college students, half of 
whom are still teenagers, to engage in forms of expression not 
suitable to a civilized society. It is important for universities to be 
cautious against substantially impeding the students' First 
Amendment rights when creating school speech policies. The 
university must pay careful attention to students' interests and cannot 
limit speech in a way that is inconsistent with its educational mission. 
Being careful, however, does not require being handcuffed; while the 
university must be respectful of the First Amendment, the Court has 
allowed for schools to infringe on students' rights of expression to a 
certain degree. 226 
2. Limited Administrative Discretion 
As with any policy implicating First Amendment rights, the 
university must also be cautious to avoid drafting a policy that grants 
administrators too much discretion in enforcement. 227 In various 
contexts, the Court has rejected broad grants of discretion to school 
administrators in educational policy-making. 228 And while school 
224. See UO Mission Statement, supra note 47. 
225. See Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (stating 
that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate"). 
226. See supra Part lll; see also Traci B. Edwards, First Amendment Rights in Public 
Schools: Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 12 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 907, 931 (1987) 
(recognizing Fraser as an example of the Court's "willingness to stretch the 
Constitution past previous limits in order to achieve its goal of the proper inculcation 
of fundamental values, even at the expense of suppressing a student's first amendment 
right of freedom of speech"). 
227. See Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 323 (2002) (noting that even 
content-neutral regulations can operate to stifle free expression, and thus violate the 
First Amendment, where a licensing official is afforded too much discretion in 
granting or denying a permit). 
228. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 
853, 872 (1982) ("(L]ocal school boards may not remove books from school library 
shelves simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those books and seek by 
their removal to 'prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or 
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administrators have certainly been granted the latitude necessary to 
effectively discharge schools' educational responsibilities, the Court 
has indicated that it will step in when basic constitutional values are 
directly and sharply implicated. 229 
With regard to the college basketball arena, this approach dictates 
that a potential policy curbing expression be precise and specific, and 
as much as possible, limit officials' discretion in enforcing that 
policy. Since the policy will necessarily be triggered only after 
students engage in the prohibited speech, it must be written in a 
manner that consistently results in viewpoint neutral enforcement.230 
So long as the policy is drafted to proscribe certain conduct and 
language, and is enforced fairly without regard to the speaker's 
views, the policy should withstand the reduced constitutional scrutiny 
applied in the education context. 
B. University Interests 
1. Educational Mission 
The educational mission of universities has been the bedrock of this 
Comment's argument that public universities may constitutionally 
enforce policies limiting student speech at college basketball games. 
In prior cases, the Court has repeatedly allowed schools to implement 
policies proven to be important in carrying out their educational 
missions.231 If universities explicitly indicate that their educational 
missions are an integral part of their student speech policies and if 
their enforcement of those policies is consistent with their missions, 
other matters of opinion."') (citation omitted); see also W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (rejecting a Board of Education's attempt to 
compel a student to salute the flag, reasoning that while boards have highly 
discretionary functions, they must be performed within the limits of the Bill of 
Rights). 
229. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 866 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)). 
230. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 689 (1986) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) ("[S]chool officials sought only to ensure that a high school assembly 
proceed in an orderly manner. There is no suggestion that school officials attempted 
to regulate respondent's speech because they disagreed with the views he sought to 
express."). 
231. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (stating that a school's 
educational judgment that racial diversity is essential to its educational mission is one 
to which the Court will defer, and therefore will allow race to be a factor in admission 
decisions); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) ("A school 
need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic educational 
mission,' even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the 
school.") (citation omitted). 
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then the Court is likely to approve of such policies. 232 Ultimately, if a 
policy prohibiting certain offensive speech in the basketball arena is 
going to withstand constitutional challenge, it would have to be 
justified by the university's interest in effectuating its educational 
miSSIOn. 
2. Continued Financial Support from Alumni 
Moreover, universities rely heavily upon alumni donations to 
provide the type of learning environments suitable to promoting their 
goals and objectives. 233 Poor fan behavior may cause concern for 
alumni, and in tum, lead to decreased donations.234 Although this 
concern has no constitutional import with regard to the legality of a 
potential policy, it is certainly critical to universities as they consider 
implementing potential policies. It is paramount that universities 
have a procedure in place to avoid incidents such as those described 
in Part I in an effort to maintain a proud tradition to which alumni 
eagerly provide support. 
VII. NECESSARY COMPONENTS OF A CONSTITUTIONALLY 
SOUND POLICY THAT BALANCES STUDENTS' RIGHTS 
TO EXPRESSION WITH UNIVERSITIES' EDUCATIONAL 
MISSIONS 
Navigation through a complex history of constitutional analysis 
concerning student speech235 and the public forum doctrine236 is futile 
absent a workable policy that simultaneously balances the interests 
involved and serves to eliminate intolerable student conduct. 
Developing such a policy to address the type of fan behavior 
presented in Part I of this Comment requires adherence to the rules 
232. See Bd. ofRegents ofUniv. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,221 (2000) 
(upholding the constitutionality of a school's mandatory student activity fee and the 
speech which it supports so far as it is consistent with the school's educational 
mission and applied on a viewpoint-neutral basis). 
233. See, e.g., About the Campaign, http://www.greatexpectations.umd.edu/about.html 
(last visited Sept. 24, 2009) (stating that in 2008, donations from over 40,000 alumni 
totaled a record-setting $130 million to support scholarships, faculty, facilities, and 
more); Great Expectations, The Campaign for Maryland, http://www.Great 
expectations.umd.edu (last visited Sept. 24, 2009) (noting that as of January 31, 2009, 
the donation campaign had raised $587 million of its $1 billion goal). 
234. See Hoover, supra note 63 (discussing deplorable student fan behavior at various 
universities around the country). 
235. See supra Part III. 
236. See supra Part IV. 
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established in the school speech decisions discussed throughout this 
Comment. 
The language of potential policies may vary, but should refer to 
several aspects to enhance their constitutional status. A 
constitutionally permissible policy should contain language 
referencing the university's educational mission and the university's 
desire to further that mission through teaching civility and acceptable 
social behavior to its students. 237 It should note the types of incidents 
that have occurred on college campuses as the reasons for its 
development. While explicitly recognizing the importance of 
protecting their students' First Amendment rights, the policy should 
impose reasonable restrictions that are viewpoint neutral. Moreover, 
enforcement of the policy should not result in suppressing expression 
merely because administrators oppose the speaker's view.238 
The policy may contain different levels of sanctions for students 
who violate the restrictions. For example, first time offenders may be 
issued warnings; second time offenders may be ejected from the 
stadium; third time offenders may be banned from the stadium for an 
entire season. Each university's choice of sanctions is important to 
the extent that it provides students with an incentive to cooperate. 
Without sanctions, a potential policy would have no teeth and thus, 
would not help to alleviate the problem of inexcusable student 
behavior. 
A university's implementation of a policy consistent with its 
educational mission that results in viewpoint neutral enforcement and 
provides specific sanctions for violators will help clean up student 
speech in the basketball arena. Once implemented, university 
policies can restore the college basketball environment to an 
enthusiastic gathering of students capable of supporting their teams 
and expressing dislike toward opponents in a manner consistent with 
the college environment. Following these guidelines should render 
future policies constitutionally sound. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
At the end of the day, the college environment is intended to be 
both educational and enjoyable. As indicated in their mission 
statements, the central purpose of public universities is to educate and 
develop young adults. Providing an energetic and exciting athletic 
program to supplement the classroom aspect of a student's 
237. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
238. See supra Part Vl.A.2 (discussing the importance of limiting administrative discretion 
in enforcing school speech policies). 
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educational experience helps the universities further their missions. 
However, providing that environment does not require universities to 
allow students to verbally abuse opposing players and their families. 
A long line of constitutional decisions indicates that because of the 
special nature of the school, the Court should and will allow public 
universities to impose reasonable restrictions on intolerable student 
speech at college basketball games. 
Jonathan Singer 
